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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse three factors that are crucial in determining whether equilibrium
is unique in coordination games with incomplete information. We show that a unique equilib-
rium exists if there is sufﬁciently (i) large uncertainty about the common component of agents’
payoffs; (ii) small degree of strategic uncertainty; and (iii)large differences in agents’ payoffs.
We call these three factors fundamental uncertainty, strategic uncertainty and heterogeneity,
respectively.
To show the trade-offs among the three factors, we construct a dynamic model where infor-
mation is released gradually and decisions are made sequentially. The dynamic model demon-
strates that gradual release of information combined with sequential choice facilitates unique
equilibriumselection. Thedynamicmodelallowstheagentstomakedecisionsubjecttoagreater
degree of fundamental uncertainty while reducing the strategic uncertainty. Hence unique equi-
lubrium selection obtains in the dynamic model for a set of parameters which yields multiple
equilibria if the model is formulated as a static one.
Keywords: coordination game, fundamental uncertainty, strategic uncertainty, heterogeneity
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D81, D84
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The difﬁculty of expectation formation in coordination games and its implication on the selection
of equilibrium have been discussed frequently in the recent game theory literature. The multiplicity
of equilibria is disturbing since when there are multiple equilibria, predicting which equilibrium is
actually played is beyond the theory, rendering the theory obsolete.
The literature on global games (see Carlsson and van Damme (1994), Morris and Shin (2001))
addresses the issue of equilibrium selection relying on incomplete information. When agents have
private information which is slightly distinct from each other, they can use the information as a
coordination device and arrive at a unique equilibrium. As subsequent works in the area show, (see
Hellwig (2001) and Morris and Shin (2002)) the equilibrium selection in global games depends on
the interactions among a few components including how precise the private information is relative to
the public information and how diverse the agents are in terms of the payoff from a particular action
choice. The current paper attmepts to clarify the equilibrium selection mechanism focusing on these
components and exploit the mechanism in a dynamic context to obtain unique equilibrium slection
even if the combination of the same parameters in a static context implies the existence of multiple
equilibria.
Consider a game where the agent’s payoff depends on unknown state of nature as well as strate-
gies chosen by all agents. Moreover the payoff from an action depends on how many agents coor-
dinate on it while the payoff from the other action is ﬁxed independent of the against the other. A
simple intuition suggests that there is a unique equilibrium when individual-speciﬁc terms in agents’
utility functions are more important (in some sense) than the term subject to the coordination.
This intuition is broadly correct, but misses much of the detail of the situation. We show that a
unique equilibrium exists if there is sufﬁciently (i) large uncertainty about the common component
of agents’ payoffs; (ii) small degree of strategic uncertainty; and (iii)large differences in agents’
payoffs. We call these three factors fundamental uncertainty, strategic uncertainty and hetero-
geneity, respectively. In order for multiple equilibria to exist, there must be a sufﬁciently large
expected co-ordination effect between agents. It is easy to understand why heterogeneity decreases
the expected co-ordination effect, since payoff heterogeneity makes agents behave idiosyncratically.
When there is a large degree of fundamental uncertainty at the time of decision making, the effect of
coordination success would be of secondary concern since most of the variation in the expected pay-
off comes from the fundamental uncetainty. In contast if the success of coordination has a dominant
1effect in the determination of the individual payoff, multiple equilibria more likely and we capture
the payoff effect of the coordination as the strategic uncertainty.
Recently there have been many papers which address related issues. The literature on global
games which have grown very rapidly relies on incomplete information to obtain unique equilibrium
selection for coordination game. Carlsson and van Damme (1994) was taken further by Morris and
Shin (1998) for the explanation of currency crisis. Morris and Shin (2001) provides an overview of
the literature so far. This paper differs from the global game literature in that we do not rely on the
asymmetric information among agents.
Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001), Frankel and Pauzner (2000), and Herrendorf, Valentinyi,
and Waldman (2000) introduce heterogeneity among agents to have the same effect on the equilib-
rium selection. However they do not allow fundamental uncertainty on the underlying stochastic
parameter, which is the crucial component in our model.
In the literature on industrial economics, the issue of path dependence has discussed for a long
time. Indeed Farrell and Saloner (1985) construct a model where dynamic coordination takes place
ina similar fashion to the present paper. They are mainly interested in producing inefﬁcient “lock-
in” and they do not allow gradual release of information. Their model can be regarded as a dynamic
version of global game where agents have asymmetric information and move in a sequential fashion.
In section 2, a static model is developed that identiﬁes the three factors and establish the neces-
sary and sufﬁcient condition for unique equilibrium selection. Section 3 extends the static analysis
to two periods; the three factors are allowed to change over time (e.g., due to learning about an
underlying state) in order to gain further understanding about their interaction. Section 4 analyses
a particular property of the dynamic equilibrium, that is, the path dependence and the ﬁnal section
concludes.
2 Static Model
Let the state of the world be denoted θ ∈ R which is not observed by agents; all agents have a
common prior on θ which is normally distributed with mean µ0 and variance σ2
0. The agents receive
the same noisy signal x of the true state, where X = θ+ and  is assumed to be normally distributed
with zero mean and variance σ2
 > 0.1 The standard properties of normal distributions imply that
1We take the notational convention that a Roman alphabet denoting a random variable is written in upper-case and
its realization is written in lower-case.










There is a continuum of agents of total mass 1, represented by the unit interval [0,1]. Agents
must choose an action from a binary action space, denoted {0,1}. Choosing action 0 guarantees the
agent zero payoff. On the other hand, the utility from choosing action 1 consists of i) ζ, which is an
idiosyncratic parameter in the agent’s utility, ii) the cost of choosing the action, which is normalized
to 1, and iii) γ, which depends on the occurrence of a particular event. The ﬁrst component, ζ,
represents the heterogeneity among agents and is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval
[0,β], β > 0, throughout the population of agents. The third component, γ > 0, represents the
beneﬁt of successful coordination: the agent receives it if the sum of the random state, θ, and the
number of agents choosing action 1, α, is sufﬁciently large (greater than some parameter D > 0);





ζ − 1 + γ if θ + α ≥ D,
ζ − 1 if θ + α < D.
(1)
The additive separability in equation (1) and the uniform distribution of ζ are not substantive as-
sumptions. The one important feature that is captured simply by this formulation is that there is
heterogeneity in the population of agents.
Given α, write the expected utility of an agent who chooses action 1 on receiving a signal X as
E[Uζ(θ,α)|X] = ζ − 1 + V (X;α,σ) (2)
where
V (X;α,σ) ≡ E[γ · 1{θ+α≥D|X≥0}], (3)
where 1{.} is the indicator function. It is easy to see that V (X;α,σ) is increasing in X and α.
Note that the function V (X;α,σ) is also parameterized by the standard deviation of the posterior
(equivalently its variance), σ, which is determined by the variance of the signal. This notation
facilitates our analysis where the fundamental uncertainty, represented by the posterior variance,
affects the decision making. Indeed we shall show that the variance of the posterior distribution
plays a crucial role for the unique equilibrium selection.
The timing of the game is that all agents receive the same random signal X at t = 0, and then
3simultaneously choose an action at t = 1.
One story supporting this model is as follows. A ﬁrm operates with an existing debt of D which
has to be serviced at the end out of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. If the proﬁt is less than debt service requirement,
then the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Proﬁt is earned from selling to consumers; in addition, random shocks
affect the ﬁrms’ proﬁt. Each consumer has unit demand, and gains additional utility if the ﬁrm is not
bankrupt at the end (this utility may come from e.g., continued availability of parts after purchase).2
A unit mass of consumers decides whether to purchase the ﬁrm’s good. With a fraction α buying,
total sales are α. The ﬁrm charges a ﬁxed price, normalized to 1. Hence the ﬁrm’s realized proﬁt,
before servicing debt, is θ + α.
A similar story can be told of A pure strategy for an agent is a mapping from its type ζ and the
signalX tothebinaryactionspace{0,1}; i.e., p : [0,β]×R → {0,1}. Agentsformaposteriorbased
on the prior and the signal according to Bayes’ rule. A Bayesian equilibrium (in pure strategies)
is a set of pure strategies such that each agent’s strategy maximizes its expected utility given the
strategies of all other agents and its Bayesian posterior.
The equilibrium of the model is deﬁned by the optimizing behavior of the agents, which is
represented by the strategy choice, together with consistency condition on their beliefs, which is
represented by the expected proportion of agents who choose action 1.
Deﬁnition 1 The agents’ choices p(ζ,α) and the beliefs on the state θ constitute a Bayesian equi-
librium of the game if





To determine the equilibrium α(X), note that for given x and α, all agents with β ≥ ζ ≥
−V (x;α,σ) have a non-negative expected utility and so choose action 1. This observation implies
that α(X) is determined as
α(X) =

   
   
0 if − V (X;o,σ) ≥ β,
1 if − V (X;1,σ) ≤ 0,
β+V (X;α,σ)
β ∈ (0,1) otherwise
(4)
2The model can be applied to various settings other than the current case of durable foods. For instance, a factor
supplier might be concerned about the ﬁnancial viability of a ﬁrm and willing to invest in the relationship only if the
ﬁrm is likely to survive. The concern indicates the possibility of coordination difﬁculty as modeled here.
3This condition follows from the fact that optimization requires choosing action 1 if and only if its payoff is positive.
4From the observation it is immediate that there is unique equilibrium for all realization of X if
α(X) is monotonically increasing. The following proposition provides the necessary and sufﬁcient
condition under which there is a unique equilibrium.




for all X ∈ R, α ∈ [0,1], and σ > 0.














∂ Pr[θ + α ≥ D|X]
∂X
Since θ is normally distributed, we can further manipulate the term having the probability on the last
line as:

















D − α − µ(X)
σ

where µ(X) is the mean of the state conditional on the signal X and φ(·) is standard normal density.
Since
∂µ(X)
∂X > 0andthestandardnormaldensityfunctionhaspositivevaleeveryhwfere, thedeir-
vative of V (X;α,σ) with respect to X is positive as desired. It follows that α(X) is monotonically
increasing if β − ∂V (X;α,σ)/∂α ≥ 0. and the sufﬁcient part follows.




5There are multiple equilibria if the equilibrium α(X) is backward bending. Consider its in-
verse function X(α). If X(α) is increasing and then decreasing, then α(X) is backward bending.









∂α ≥ β for some X, then there is a range of X over which the numerator is smaller than
0 and thus α is backward-bending. It follows that there are multiple equilibria if
∂V (X;α,σ)
∂α ≥ β. The
proof is complete.
We can interpret the necessary and sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 1 in terms of the three
components. To do this we ﬁrst demonstrate a trade-off between the fundamental uncertainty and
the strategic uncertainty in the following lemma.























D − α − µ(X)
σ





σ0 . Since the standard normal














D − α − µ(X)
σ0

The case where D −α −µ(X) ≤ 0 can be proved similarly except that the standard normal density
function is increasing to the left of zero. The two cases together prove the claim.
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 1 crucially depends on the merginal contri-
bution of the proportion of agents who coordinate on action 1. The lemma implies that the marginal
6contribution gets smaller when the agents have noisier information about the state. This is the trade-
off we exploit to obtain unique equilibrium selection in the dynamic model. The intuition behind
the lemma is made explicit in the following corollary where we obtain a characterization of the con-
ditions for unique equilibrium selection. We ﬁrst provide a more precise deﬁnition of the following
three factors
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition (5) allows a characterization of the equilibrium unique-
ness in terms of three factors in the game:
1. Heterogeneity measured by β.
2. Fundamental uncertainty measured by σ.
3. Strategic uncertainty measured by γ.
The heterogeneity is captured by β in the model. Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2000) and
Herendorf, Valentinyi, and Waldman (2000) exploited this form of heterogeneity to obtain unique
equilibrium selection in a model of endogenous growth. It measures how different preference agents
may have. The fundamental uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of the posterior;
it captures how much uncertainty the agents have after the receipt of signals. If this uncetainty
vanishes, the game is a pure coordination game. Finally the strategic uncetainty is represented by
γ which is the utility effect of coordinatin success. We observe that the size of the population is
another component of the model which can potentially determine the strategic uncertainty. If there
are more agents who may buy the product of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt may ﬂuctuate more dueto the
coordination among the agents. In our model we take the population size as normalized quantity and
any effect due to the signiﬁcance of the market size relative the debt is capture by the utility effect
of coordinatin success.
Corollary 1 (i) For any given γ and σ, there exists β∗ > 0 such that equilibrium is unique if
β ≥ β∗.
(ii) For any given β and γ, there exists σ∗ ≥ 0 such that equilibrium is unique if σ ≥ σ∗.
(iii) For any given β and σ, there exists γ∗ > 0 such that equilibrium is unique if γ ≤ γ∗.








D − α − µ(X)
σ
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since the standard normal density function has values bewteen 0 and 1 √
2π.
We can rewrite the necessary and sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 1 as








For a given values of γ and σ, let β∗ = γ · 1
σ · 1 √
2π. Then for any β ≥ β∗, the necessary and
sufﬁcient condition is satisﬁed and thus there exists a unique equilibrium, which proves part i). Part
ii) and iii) are proved similarly. We omit the detail.
3 Dynamic Model
We construct a dynamic model based on the static one to demonstrate how the three factors—
heterogeneity, fundamental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty—interact over time to resolve the
difﬁculty of coordination. We analyse the interaction of the factors in a two period model in which
information is received over time.
In each period t, a signal Xt is drawn and observed by all agents. The signal Xt in period t about
the state θ is determined by Xt = θ + t; {t}t∈{1,2} are drawn independently from the same normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2
. The common prior over θ is normally distributed with
mean µ0 and variance σ2
0. Hence initially {Xt}t∈{1,2} are distributed normally with mean µ0 and the
variance σ2 = σ2
0 + σ2
. The information sets Ωt for all agents at time t are, therefore, Ω1 = {X1}
and Ω2 = {X1,X2,α1}. Notice that α2 and X2 are all random variables at the beginning of period
1 (after the signal X1 is observed). In period 2, the signal, X1, and fraction of agents choosing 1 in
the ﬁrst period, α1, have been observed, and the signal X2 received.





ζ − 1 + γ if θ + α1 + α2 ≥ D,
ζ − 1 if θ + α1 + α2 < D.
(10)
8A pure strategy for an agent in the ﬁrst period is a mapping from its type ζ and the signal X1
to the binary action space {0,1}; i.e., s : [0,β] × R → {0,1}. A pure strategy for an agent in
the second period is a mapping from its type ζ, the signals X1,X2 and the fraction of agents who
purchased in the ﬁrst period, to the binary action space {0,1}; i.e., s : [0,β]×R2 ×[0,1] → {0,1}.
A Bayesian perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies) is a set of pure strategies and set of beliefs
such that (i) beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule and the equilibrium strategies; (ii) each agent’s
strategy maximizes its expected utility given the subsequent strategies of all other agents and its
beliefs. It can be obtained with minor modiﬁcation from the Bayesian equilibrium deﬁned in the
previous section.
In the following we take 3 different move orders / information structures to highlight the inter-
action of the factors.
3.1 Simultaneous Information and Choice
With the sequential set-up explained, we ﬁrst analyse the benchmark case where two signals are
received simultaneously and a mass 2 of agents with idiosyncratic valuations ζ distributed on [0,β]
choose simultaneously whether to purchase or not. Hence Ω1 = Ω2 = {X1,X2}. This case is
identical to the static model explained in the previous section except for additional structure on the
agent’s decision making procedure.







0). Expected utility of a type-ζ agent from choosing action 1 is therefore
E[Uζ(θ,α)] = ζ − 1 + γP[θ + 2α ≥ D|X1,X2],
(For comparison with later calculations, α is the fraction of a unit mass of agents choosing 1, so that
in total a mass 2α chooses 1.) Since θ is normally distributed with mean µ2 and variance σ2
2,








where Φ(·) is the distribution function of the standard normal. Comparing with equation (3), let



















and so the parameter γ is the measure of strategic uncertainty identiﬁed in section 2.
Agents choose 1 if and only if the expected net utility from doing so is greater than zero. In
equilibrium, therefore, α is determined as
α =

    
    























β ∈ (0,1) otherwise.
(11)






















where φ(·) is the density function of the standard normal distribution, and α is determined by equa-
tion (11). Since φ(·) ≤ 1 √















σ2 It sufﬁces to ﬁnd signal draws for which
multiple equilibria exist. Consider signal draws such that
µ2 = D −
2(β − 1) + γ
β
.
Then α, determined by the equilibrium condition (11), is (2(β − 1) + γ)/2β and D − 2α − µ2 = 0.

















since φ(0) = 1 √





The necessary and sufﬁcient condition illustrates the balance between heterogeneity β, funda-
mental uncertainty, measured here by σ2 and strategic uncertainty γ, identiﬁed in section 2.
3.2 Simultaneous Information and Sequential Choice
The next benchmark examined, before turning to the ‘fully’ sequential problem, is that in which a
unit mass of agents choose in each of the two periods, with the same information: signals X1 and
X2 drawn at the beginning of period 1 and observed by both sets of agents. Hence Ω1 = {X1,X2}
and Ω2 = {X1,X2,α1}.
As in the previous section, the common posterior on the state is normally distributed with mean









σ2 , then there is a unique equilibrium in the sequential choice / simulta-
neous information case.
Proof. Consider the decision of agents in the second period. Expected utility of a type-ζ agent
is
E[Uζ(θ,α2)] = ζ − 1 + γP[θ + ¯ α1 + α2 ≥ D|x1,x2],








(The notation ¯ α1 emphasizes that α1 is parametric to agents in the second period.)
The equivalent of previous calculations for necessary and sufﬁcient condition for unique equi-











when α2 is determined by
α2 =

















Similarly expected utility of a type-ζ agent in the ﬁrst period is











    
    

























α1 is given by the implicit equation
α1 =
















































depending on the value of α2. Note that we need α2 is increasing in α1 to make equation (16)




























σ2 because φ(·) ≤ 1 √
2π. Since this condition implies
the monotonicity of α2 in µ2 as well as α1, there is a unique equilibrium for the second period as
well as the ﬁrst period if and only of this condition is satisﬁed. The proof is complete.
12The proposition reveals an interesting aspect of the decision making under coordination difﬁ-
culty. The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for sequential choice/ simultaneous information case
is exactly the same as that for simultaneous choice / information case. Hence simply uncoupling
the timing of decision for different agents does not alter the nature of coordination difﬁculty. Those
agents who move later may use the decision of the early-movers to remove strategic uncertainty as
indicated in the intermediate step in the proof. However the early movers who take account of the
late movers face the same coordination difﬁculty since their decision is subsequently ampliﬁed by
those who decide in the later stage; the early mover’s decision effectively has a bigger impact on the
strategic uncertainty. It follows that early movers require the same necessary and sufﬁcient condition
on the three components since the smaller mass of agents who move together in the early stage is
exactly offset by the ampliﬁcation of the strategic uncertainty.
3.3 The Sequential Information and Choice
Finally, we can analyse the case in which choices are made and signals received sequentially. The
decision of agents in the second period is the same as for the previous case (sequential choice and
simultaneous information). The ﬁrst period problem is different, however. Previously, the fraction
α2 of agents choosing 1 in the second period was certain (even if indeterminate due to multiplicity).
Now, α2 is a random variable from the perspective of period-1 agents. Hence Ω1 = {X1} and
Ω2 = {X1,X2,α1}.
In the second period, the agents’ common posterior on θ is given identical to the one in the
previous subsection: it is normally distributed with mean µ2 = (σ2µ0 + σ2





0). In the ﬁrst period, agents’ common posterior on θ is normally
distributed with mean µ1 = (σ2µ0 + σ2
0x1)/(σ2 + σ2






γ ≥ ( 1
σ1 + 1
σ2) 1 √
2π, then there is a unique equilibrium in the sequential choice /
information case.
Proof. We start with the second period problem for the sequential case, which is identical to
that for the sequential choice/simultaneous information case considered in the previous subsection.











13when α2 is determined by
α2 =









Hence the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for unique equilibrium in the second period is σ2 ≥
γ √
2πβ.
Expected utility of a type-ζ agent in the ﬁrst period is
ζ − 1 + γP[θ + α1 + ˜ α2 ≥ D|x1],
where the notation ˜ α2 emphasizes that it is a random variable.
Those agents who make decision in the ﬁrst period must compute the probability of the sum of
two random variables, θ and α2; since the second period’s decision is made conditional on X2, α2 is
a function of the random variable X2.
To apply the necessary and sufﬁcient condition in Lemma 1, we assess
dP[θ + ˜ α2 ≥ D − α1|x1]
dα1
where the left hand side of the inequality inside the probability contains only random variables while
the right hand side contains only parameters.
First observe that θ and X2 = θ + 2 are bivariate-normally distributed random variables; con-




. Their covariance is given by σ2





















φ(ˆ θ, ˆ X2) dˆ θ d ˆ X2 (20)
where φx1(θ,X2) on the ﬁrst line is the bivariate normal distribution of θ and X2 conditional on the
observation of x1, while ˆ θ =
θ−µ1





so that φ(ˆ θ, ˆ X2) on the second line is the
standard bivariate normal distribution.












φ(ˆ θ, ˆ X2) dˆ θ d ˆ X2 (21)
















D − α1 − ˜ α2(X2)
σ1
,X2)









βσ2 − γ 1 √
2π
where the inequality follows from the fact that φ(.) ≤ 1 √
2π.
Collecting these results and substituting them into (21) yields,
d
dα1












































It follows that d







We now apply the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the unique equilibrium from Lemma 1:




P[θ + ˜ α2(X2| α1) ≥ D − α1|x1] (23)
Substituting equation (22) into (23) we obtain the following sufﬁcient condition for uniqueness:



























Observe that under this condition, the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for uniqueness in the second
period is also satisﬁed and the proof is complete.
The proposition indicates that there is a unique equilibrium in a model with sequential choice
and information for a milder condition on the three factors than the simultaneous choice /informa-
tion model or sequential choice /simultaneous information. The following corollary formalizes this
observation.
Corollary 2 Given an arbitrary set of parameters on the fundamental uncertainty, there is a set of
parameters on the strategic uncertainty and heterogeneity for which there is a unique equilibrium
under sequential choice /information while there are multiple equilibria under simultaneous choice




















Proof. Notice that 2
σ2 > 1
σ1 + 1
σ2 since σ2 < σ1. Hence we can always ﬁnd
β
γ that satisﬁes the
condition in the corollary. The proof follows by combining the conditions from Propositions 2, 3,
and 4.
The intuition behind Corollary 2 can be explained by the interaction among the three factors
which together determine the difﬁculty of equilibrium selection. In the simultaneous choice / infor-
mation model the requirement on the three factors is exactly identical to the one in the static model.
In the sequential choice / simultaneous information model, strategic uncertainty unravels gradually
and thus it appears that the requirement for uniqueness might be milder. However those agents who
move in the ﬁrst period fully anticipate the consequence of their choice in terms of the reduction
in strategic uncertainty. When the choice of the agents who move in the second period is correctly
anticipated, the reduced fundamental uncertainty due to full revelation of information implies the
same degree of difﬁculty in coordination. In contrast the sequential choice / information model sug-
gests that gradual revelation of information is critical in removing the coordination difﬁculty. Those
agents who move in the ﬁrst period fully anticipate the response of the agents who move in the fu-
16ture. However they do not have as precise information as to the fundamental uncertainty so that they
can make a unique choice conditional on the information available. In the second period, additional
information as to the fundamental uncertainty is available. However part of the strategic uncertainty
is resolved since half of the population already made their choice in the ﬁrst period so that unique
equilibrium exists in the second period as well.
4 Path Dependence
Theintuitionbehindtheuniqueequilibriumselectioninthesequentialchoice/informationmodelhas
an interesting implication on the dynamic behavior of the model. The agents who move in the ﬁrst
period have to make their choice with less information than those in the second period. On the other
hand the decision made by the former is regarded as a commitment to a particular strategy by the
agents who move in the second period. Part of the difﬁculty in the equilibrium selection stems from
the fact that agents face too much strategic uncertainty compared to the fundamental uncertainty.
The commitment made by the ﬁrst period agents helps reducing the strategic uncertainty in the
second period when more information is available. This observation implies that the ﬁrst period
agents effectively select one of the possible equilibria. This observation in turn is evidenced by path
dependence in sense that the different sequence of signals alter the overall selection of equilibrium.
Due to the commitment power of the agents who make decision in the ﬁrst period, the signals which
arrive in the ﬁrst period may have a bigger effect on the determination of equilibrium path. This is
conﬁrmed along the equilibrium path, which we call path dependence.
Casual observation of various economics time series indicates that the ﬂuctuation depends not
only on the information content of economic signals driving it, but also on the order of the informa-
tion arrival. The dynamic equilibrium selection in the sequential information and choice generates
such a feature.
Proposition 5 The distribution of α2 conditional on α1 is ranked in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance.
Proof. We show that if α1 ≥ α0
1, then P{α2 ≥ a| α1} ≥ P{α2 ≥ a| α0
1} for a ∈ [0,1]. First
note that α2 is a function of α1 and X2: α2(α1,X2). Hence the distribution of α2 is derived from
the distribution of X2 which is normally distributed. Moreover given α1, there is unique x for which
X2 ≥ x if and only α2(α1,X2) ≥ a because under the unique equilibrium for sequential choice /
17information model, α2 is uniquely determined once X2 is. Denote such x as x(α2|α1) and let ψ(α2)
be the density function of α2. Write








where φ(.) is normal density function.
To show that P{α2 ≥ a| α1} ≥ P{α2 ≥ a| α0
1} for a ∈ [0,1], it sufﬁces to prove that x(a|α1) is
decreasing in α1. Since α2 is determined from the implicit equilibrium condition,
α2 =















It follows that x(a|α1) < x(a|α0
1) if α1 ≥ α0
1.
The stochastic dominance demonstrated in the proposition holds even after controlling for the
informational effect of ﬁrst period signal. Since the signals are drawn conditional on the realiza-
tion of the fundamental uncertainty, positive signal in the ﬁrst period implies that there is a bigger
probability that the state is good. The following example shows that the relationship of stochastic
dominance remains even if the agents in the second period may entertain the same belief about the
state of nature. In particular it implies that the resolution of strategic uncertainty has a substantial
effect on the equilibrium path in addition to that of fundamental uncertainty.
Example 1 Consider two realizations of signals of the same total information content but reversed
order, x = (x1,x2) and x0 = (x2,x1) where x1 > x2. Then α1|x > α1|x0 and α2|x > α2|x0.
The example can be proved as follows. Given that x1 > x2, the ﬁrst period agents’ choice sat-
isﬁes α1|x1 > α1|x2 since the posterior distribution in the ﬁrst period has a higher mean conditional
on x1 than x2.
Recall that the second period equilibrium is determined from
α2 =





18Notice that both sequences of signals produce the same mean and the same variances for θ in the
second period: µ2 and σ2
2 are identical for both x = (x1,x2) and x0 = (x2,x1). Moreover α1|x1 >
α1|x2 from above. We know that α2 as a function of α1 is increasing in α1. Since α2 depends on
µ2, σ2, and α1 where the ﬁrst two are identical for both sequences and only α1 differs in the two
sequences, α2|x > α2|x0 as stated in the example.
5 Conclusion
We considered a model of coordination game under incomplete information which may have mul-
tiple equilibria depending on the realization of information. The coordination problem arises be-
cause the payoff effect due to coordination dominates that due to correct statistical decision and
heterogeneity. We constructed a dynamic model where gradual information release together with
distributed decision timing facilitates the unique equilibrium selection.
Our result implies that empirical test of economic phenomena which are subject to coordination
problem should pay attention to the dynamic nature of the economics environment. For instance,
ignoring the dynamic information release may lead the economist to conclude that the economy was
subject to multiple equilibria although actual agents who lived the time did not have difﬁculties due
to multiple equilibria.
The path dependence result seems to indicate the relevance of techinical analysis for inverstment
decision. Modern ﬁnance theory assumes that the price process follows random walk hypothesis so
that the past price path carries no additional information over and above the current price. According
to the path dependence, paying attention to the price path may provide more information about the
future direction of the movement.
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